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A Methodological Deconstruction
of Comparative Research
REBECCA

A. VAN VOORHIS

California State University
Department of Sociology & Social Services

Research on modern welfare states has been strongly influenced by the theory that they develop accordingto patterns,which form distinct regimesliberal, corporatist,and social democratic. These regimes are characterized
by several key variables, among which the decommodification of labor
is heavily weighted. This article examines the operational assumptions,
measures, and calculations used in the most widely cited empirical study
around which distinct regime theory has developed over the last decade.
The findings reveal critical methodological weaknesses in the conceptualization and quantificationof decommodification measures, which form the
empirical cornerstoneof distinct regime theory.

Theory and research on the development of the modern
welfare states tend to be concentrated around two lines of analysis which emphasize either impersonal forces of structuralfunctional change or the socio-political forces of contending
group interests. The structural-functional approach is associated
with convergence theory, which posits that over time the programs and policies of welfare states in the advanced industrial
countries develop a considerable resemblance to one another. The
socio-political approach is associated with distinct regime theory,
which holds that there are systematic variations in programs and
policies reflected in particular types of welfare states that emerge
from different socio-political adaptations (Van Voorhis, 1998).
Among the numerous studies that have advanced distinct
regime theory, the most influential contribution to date is EspingAndersen's (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. The signifiJournal of Sociology and Social Welfare, December, 2002, Volume XXIX, Number 4
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cance of this work is three-fold. First, this impressive quantitative comparative study of 18 countries greatly extended the
boundaries of empirical socio-political welfare state analysisproviding a strong quantitative socio-political response to Wilensky's (1975) landmark functionalist study of convergence. Second,
the work builds upon the theoretical contributions of Titmuss
(1974) and other earlier theorists, and refined the differences between welfare states by identifying three distinct regimes. Third,
in focusing on separate welfare state regimes, this study offers an
explanation for the causes of welfare state differences.
The distinct regime model identifies a liberal, corporatist, and
social democratic paradigm by formulating a systematic comparison of how policies and programs reflect: a) the degree to which
labor is decommodified; b) the relationship of entitlements to
need, contributions, or citizenship; and c) the type of the publicprivate mix in social provisions, particularly pensions. The three
regimes and their distinguishing characteristics are represented
in Table 1 below. In addition to the characteristics in Table 1,
the three regimes are seen as creating different systems of social
stratification that help to determine and maintain class and status
differentiations. In this schema, the Liberal regime is associated
with poor relief that maintains class distinctions based on income;
the Corporatist regime is identified with contributory social insurance that sustains differentiation based on occupational status;
and the Social Democratic regime is linked to middle-class universalism and social equality. Over the last decade this classification
of distinct regimes has had a substantial impact on the conceptualization of comparative welfare state research. One of the most
recent examples is Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven's 1999
analysis of The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism-arigorous study
of three countries in the Esping-Andersen sample identified as
liberal (U.S.), social democratic (the Netherlands) and corporatist
(Germany) regimes.
The empirical claim to the identification of distinct regimes
is supported by quantitative measurement of several key characteristics, among which the most elaborate and systematic analysis is devoted to the decommodification of labor-a widelycited analysis that provides the clearest case for the clustering
of three regimes. An entire chapter is addressed to the discussion
and quantification of decommodification, which is operationally
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defined by an index that measures the relative degrees of decommodification offered by three separate social insurance programs-old age pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits.
The concept of decommodification represents the idea that social policies of modern welfare state provide a level of income
maintenance, which allows individuals to "opt-out of work",
thereby reducing the necessity to sell their labor at any price in
order to survive. Hence, social welfare benefits create a buffer
against human labor being treated merely as a commodity that
can be bought for the lowest price. The distinct regime thesis
suggests that different welfare states foster varying degrees of
decommodification, which can be measured by examining rules
for eligibility, disincentives and benefit levels.
The division of welfare capitalism into three worlds of Liberal, Corporatist and Social Democratic regimes is an ambitious
formulation, and as such has drawn various criticisms. The critiques leveled against this formulation usually involve conceptual
and theoretical assessments of the broad conclusions from this
study, rather than an in-depth review of the empirical analysis
(Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, et. al, 1994; Baldwin, 1996; Sorenson,
1996, Overbye, 1996). It has also been argued that the division
of three worlds is based on a relatively small number of subjects
(N= 18) and that the data which are utilized may not accurately
portray the unique ideological and class compositions of the
countries involved (Kvist & Torfing, 1996). This article provides a
detailed analysis of the operational assumptions, measures, and
calculations used to create the decommodification index, which
represents not only the cornerstone concept in the theoretical
foundation of distinct regimes, but offers the empirical glue for
clustering of these regimes. This analysis is conducted on three
levels: 1) the selection and definition of the decommodification
indicators within programs 2) the selection and definition of
programs scored on these indicators and 3) the calculation of the
overall decommodification score-assumptions and alternatives.
Operational Definition: What's Included and What's Left Out?
In constructing the decommodification index several different
indicators were employed to operationally define the degree to
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which old age pensions, sickness, and unemployment programs
permitted individuals to maintain a livelihood without reliance
on the market. For example in the case of pensions, an index
was constructed using the following variables: 1) the replacement
rate of the minimum pension benefit for an average production
worker 2) the standard replacement rate of a pension benefit for a
normal worker 3) the required period of contribution to become
fully vested (inversely counted) and 4) the individual contribution rate. The two measures of replacement rates (variables 1 and
2) were then given a double weight in the final pension score. Presumably, the reason for including both the minimum and average
pension benefit is to determine the minimum income regardless
of what one contributed to the system. A higher level minimum
benefit (higher replacement rate) acts as a greater decommodifier
of labor than a lower level benefit, or put another way, the less
the benefit is tied to employment more it decommodifies labor.
All 18 countries in Esping-Andersen's sample were ranked
on each of these four indicators according to a three point scale1-low decommodification 2-for medium or 3-for high decommodification-in which the designations of high and low are
based on scores of plus or minus one standard deviation from the
mean. The cumulative value of these scores was then weighted
by the percent of the relevant population covered by the pension
program, which produced the pension decommodification score.
A similar procedure was performed for both sickness and unemployment benefits, using replacement rates and other slightly
different indicators appropriate to each benefit.
A critical examination the individual variables included in
this operational definition reveals serious flaws. Two of the variables in the pension decommodification index-i) the minimum
pension replacement rate ("minimum pension as a percent of
normal worker earnings net of taxes") and 2) "the standard pension replacement rate (net)for a single person" (Esping-Andersen,
1990, p. 49)-are such similar measures that the replacement rate
variable is essentially counted twice, with each count multiplied
by a factor of two. As a result of this procedure, replacement rates
effectively account for 66% of the pension score in the decommodification in index and 40% of the two other scores (sickness and
employment) in the index. But to what extent does a comparison
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of replacement rates specify how well social welfare benefits
permit workers "to uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation?" (Esping-Andersen,
p. 37) There are two basic problems with the way this index is
operationalized.
First, international comparisons are plagued by problems related to standardization and differences in the real value of the
benefit relative to the cost-of-living. The best way to assess the
comparative value of pension benefits relative to the cost of living
in each country is to operationalize these benefits on the basis
of parity adjusted replacement rates (Amzallag, 1995). Offering
greater standardization for comparative purposes, these rates are
usually calculated using a simple formula of Average Production
Worker-wage/Average Pension benefit * Purchasing Power Parities (Whiteford, 1996). By factoring in the purchasing power parities, this measure of replacement rates can be used as a proxy for
comparing levels of benefits in different countries and the degree
of social protection afforded by different welfare states. In using
pension replacement rates that are not adjusted for purchasing
power parities, the decommodification index provides a crude
measure for comparative purposes.
If the use of soft measures is a critical observation on what is
included in the index, the second problem concerns what is not
included, which raises a more fundamental issue that challenges
the basic validity of this index. The measurement of pensions,
for example, does not account for policy variations in the normal
retirement age (NRA). All countries base eligibility for pensions
on criteria that include the attainment of a minimum age. If
country A has a 10% higher wage replacement rate than country B,
but requires a worker to be 3 or 4 years older in order to retire3 or 4 years is more than 10% of the life expectancy when the
normal age of retirement is 65-which country's pension policies
offer a higher degree of decommodification ?
Even if variables such as the normal retirement age were
included, a larger issue remains. That is, the replacement incomes furnished through the three public programs-pensions,
sickness, and unemployment-ignore a wide range of financial
supports related to pensions, sickness, and unemployment benefits that welfare states are increasingly providing through social
policies which do not show up as direct public expenditures.
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As Adema (1999) points out, international comparisons of social
welfare that measure only direct cash transfers convey an incomplete view of public social efforts. He suggests it is hazardous
to draw serious conclusions about comparative benefits on the
basis of gross spending indicators. A full understanding of the
scope and value of social benefits provided by modern welfare
states requires calculations based on a comprehensive ledger that
includes both publicly mandated private benefits as well as voluntary private social benefits.
Publicly mandated private benefits, which usually involve
employer payments for absence from work due to sickness and
pension contributions to employer-based pension plans, have
been legislated in many countries including Denmark, Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, Norway,
and the United Kingdom. Replacement rates that are calculated
on public old age pensions create a misleading picture of the real
standard of living that retired workers can sustain when publicly
mandated private pension benefits are also counted.
In the same vein an accurate accounting of the extent to which
social welfare provisions promote the decommodification of labor
must include the cash value of voluntary private benefits, such as
employer-provided pensions, health insurance, unemployment
compensation, severance pay, and sickness compensation. Although these voluntary provisions are not publicly mandated,
they are publicly subsidized to varying degrees through tax concessions. Indeed, as shown by Adema's (1999) rigorous calculations, when international comparisons of social welfare transfers involve a comprehensive accounting of direct cash benefits
as well as the value of other public measures and subsidizes,
there is a remarkable leveling of differences between the traditionally high public Social Democratic countries and Liberal
regimes such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Based
on the conventional measures, for example, Denmark ranks 1 st
and the U.S. ranks 1 2 th in gross public social expenditure. But
when social spending is adjusted for taxation of benefits, tax
expenditures, publicly mandated private benefits and voluntary
private benefits, the U.S. moves to 6 th place and Denmark falls to
7 th

place.

Looking closely at how programs in the United States were
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scored on the decommodification index reveals some of the difficulties of comparative research that attempts to cover a wide
and complex range of policies. According to the operational definitions employed in this index, the United States does not provide a cash benefit for Sickness-receiving a score of zero for
that category. Esping-Andersen does not elaborate on the definition of "Sickness Benefits". If this program refers to "sick leave"
with benefits provided when short-term illness prevents work,
arguably many U.S. employers offer the functional equivalent as
a part of an employees' tax subsidized fringe benefits. However,
the decommodification power of sickness programs is measured
empirically by ranking the 1) replacement rates for the first 26
weeks of illness 2) number of weeks of employment required
prior to illness to qualify 3) number of days before benefit is
paid and 4) length of receipt. Although the exact definition is
unclear, these criteria suggest that sickness benefits under consideration involve something more than fringe benefit sick days
provided by an employer in the U.S., or payments from European
employers for short-term illness (Prins, 1990). In many countries
when short-term sickness benefits are exhausted, the employee
is then paid a disability benefit (SSA, 1996). Since the duration
and level of benefits vary between countries, an argument can be
made that three separate U.S. programs, 1) the disability portion
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 2), the Disability Insurance
part of Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and
3) Worker's Compensation would accommodate the definition of
sickness benefits.
Supplemental Security Income is a social assistance program
which provides a cash grant to persons unable to engage in any
gainful activity by reason of a disability expected to last for a year
or more. There is no stipulation that a program must be social
insurance-based in order to qualify for inclusion in the decommodification index. (Australia's means-tested pension program
is included, but received a reduced score.) If classification as
social insurance were a prerequisite, a second program could
have been counted in the index, namely, Disability Insurance,
part of Old Age Survivor's and Disability Insurance (OASDI), the
United State's largest social welfare program. While the American
program of Disability Insurance may be less generous that its
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European counterparts, the system is similar enough to merit
inclusion. Disability benefits are payable to persons who are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a physical
or mental impairment, expected to last for 12 months or more
(SSA, 1996).
A third program "Workers' Compensation" (WC) also provides sickness benefits for workers who are hurt or injured on the
job, or who develop job related diseases. While all but three states
in the U.S. have instituted a form of Workers' Compensation, it
is not a federal program and the lack of standardization between
state programs could be a significant obstacle to developing a
measure for an index. Moreover, WC may be more narrow than
many sickness benefits furnished by other countries since it is
linked to job related injury. However, most states provide relatively high replacement rates-usually two-thirds of the worker's
salary, plus coverage for incurred medical expenses. While it may
have been difficult to incorporate any or all of these programs into
the decommodification index, failure to acknowledge the widespread benefits of short-term sick leave or existence of three separate programs which provide long-term support for people with
disabling illnesses imprecisely categorizes the US as a country
without a sickness benefit.
Quantification: Inadvertent Weighting
In an effort to quantify the levels of decommodification,
Esping-Andersen adds the specific decommodification scores for
each of the three programs-pensions, sickness, and unemployment-to arrive at an overall decommodification index score,
shown in column three, Table 2. The 18 countries are ranked
from low (18) to high (1) levels of decommodification. based
on their cumulative index scores. As illustrated in Table 2, these
countries divide evenly into three clusters characterized by high
(Social Democratic), moderate (Corporatist), and low (Liberal)
levels of decommodification, lending empirical support to the
distinct regime classification.
An analysis of variance was conducted to assess the distinctiveness of the three groups from a statistical perspective. As
noted in Table 3, the Tukey's B procedure supports the distinct
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Table 2

Overall DecommodificationIndex and Regime Clusters
Country

Rank

Decommodification
Index Score

Australia
United States*
New Zealand
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom

(18)
(17)
(16)
(15)
(14)
(13)

13.0
13.8
17.1
22.0
23.3
23.4

Italy
Japan
France
Germany
Finland
Switzerland

(12)
(11)
(10)
(9)
(8)
(7)

24.1
27.1
27.5
27.7
29.2
29.7

Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Sweden

(6)
(4/5)
(4/5)
(3)
(2)
(1)

31.1
32.4
32.4
38.1
38.3
39.1
Mean = 27.2

Source: Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 52.
*According to the additive approach described by Esping-Andersen the U.S.
score should be 14.2

regime interpretation in the sense that the mean decommodification scores for each group are significantly different from one
another.
However, before drawing too firm a conclusion about how
well the results of the decommodification index support the distinct regime thesis, it is worth taking a closer look at the additive
method by which the overall index score was quantified. The
data in Table 4 show that pension benefits had the highest decommodification scores, averaging 10.7, followed by sickness benefits,
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance: DecommodificationIndex Groupings
Mean
Tukey HSD

(I) Group

(J)Group

Difference

Std. Error

Significance

1.00

2.00
3.00

-8.8000*
-16.4667*

2.102
2.102

.002
.000

2.00

3.00

-7.6667*

2.102

.006

*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level

which averaged 9.2 and unemployment benefits, which averaged
7.1. If the objective is to compare countries relative to each other
on all three program areas, then adding the decommodification
scores inadvertently weights pensions (with a mean of 10.7) almost 50% more than unemployment (with a mean of 7.10). Since,
as noted earlier, the way pension scores were originally calculated
lent decisive value to wage replacement rates, the disproportionate weight allotted to pension scores in the overall index
makes the "decommodification index" almost a proxy for wage
replacement rates of old age pensions. The problem here is not
simply that the pension scores are weighted 50% more than unemployment scores, but that country rankings differ considerably
on these two program areas. As illustrated in Table 4, Sweden, for
example, ranks 1 st on the degree of decommodification in the area
of pensions and 1 0 th on unemployment programs.
The logic of using different programs to operationally define
decommodification suggests that if the countries being studied
actually fell into three distinct clusters (high, medium, and low
levels of decommodification) the pattern would be internally consistent across different program areas. According to this logic, the
development of an overall index should give equal weight to how
the countries cluster on each program. Rather than adding the
raw decommodification scores for each program, a more precise
approach to weighting the programs equally would be to standardize the raw scores by calculating z-scores for each program
(shown in Table 4). Then, by adding the z-scores to compute the
overall decommodification index, each of the three component
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Table 4
Raw and Standardized Decommodification Scores for Old-Age
Pensions, Sickness Benefits and Unemployment Insurance
Pensions
Raw
Rank DS*
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
United States

(16)
(6)
(2)
(13)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(12)
(15)
(9)
(8)
(7)
(10)
(3)
(1)
(11)
(12)
(14)

5.0
11.9
15.0
7.7
15.0
14.0
12.0
8.5
6.7
9.6
10.5
10.8
9.1
14.9
17.0
9.0
8.5
7.0

Sickness
Z

Rank

-6.7
0.36
1.27
-0.88
1.27
0.98
0.39
-0.64
-1.17
-0.32
-0.05
0.04
-0.46
1.24
1.86
-0.49
-0.64
-1.08

(15)
(3)
(10)
(14)
(1)
(7)
(9)
(5)
(11)
(8)
(13)
(6)
(15)
(2)
(1)
(4)
(12)
(16)

Raw
DS*

Unemployment
Z

4.0 -1.29
12.5
0.84
8.8 -0.09
6.3 -0.79
15.0
1.46
10.0
0.21
9.2
0.01
11.3
0.54
8.3 -0.21
9.4
0.06
6.8 -0.59
10.5
0.34
4.0 -1.29
14.0
1.21
15.0
1.46
12.0 0.71
7.7 -0.36
0.0 -2.29

Raw
Rank DS*
(16)
(11)
(4)
(7)
(6)
(13)
(12)
(8)
(5)
(14)
(15)
(1)
(6)
(2)
(10)
(3)
(9)
(9)

4.0
6.7
8.6
8.0
8.1
5.2
6.3
7.9
8.3
5.1
5.0
11.1
4.0
9.4
7.1
8.8
7.2
7.2

Z
-1.62
-0.21
0.78
0.46
0.52
-1.00
-0.42
0.41
0.62
-1.05
-1.10
2.08
-1.62
1.19
-0.01
0.88
0.05
0.05

Mean
S.D.
* Decommodification Score
Calculations based on data from: Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of
welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 50. For scoring
procedure see Three worlds, pp. 77-78.

programs (sickness, pensions, and unemployment) contributes
equally to each country's position on the final ranking. When
the overall index is computed based on standardized scores for
each component program, the findings show that the 18 countries
no longer divide so neatly into the three groupings of distinct
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Table 5
Rank-Order of Welfare States Based on Alternative Computation of
The DecommodificationIndex

Rank

Decommodification
Score

Rank
Based on Z

Z
Score

Australia
United States
New Zealand
Canada
Ireland
United Kingdom

(18)
(17)
(16)
(15)
(14)
(13)

13.0
13.8
17.1
22.0
23.3
23.4

(18)
(16)
(17)
(13)
(11)*
(12)*

-4.59
-3.33
-3.38
-1.13
-0.77
-0.96

Italy
Japan
France
Germany
Finland
Switzerland

(12)
(11)
(10)
(9)
(8)
(7)

24.1
27.1
27.5
27.7
29.2
29.7

(14)*
(15)*
(10)
(8)
(9)
(6)*

-1.31
-1.74
-0.02
0.31
0.19
1.10

Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Sweden

(6)
(4/5)
(4/5)
(3)
(2)
(1)

31.1
32.4
32.4
38.1
38.3
39.1

(7)*
(5)
(4)
(3)
(1)
(2)

0.98
1.96
2.45
3.25
3.65
3.32

Mean = 27.2
S.D. = 7.7
*Countries which change grouping when rank based on Z score
Source: Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 52.
regimes, which was produced by the index based on the raw
scores for each program. Indeed, as illustrated in Table 5, while
the rank-order changes are not large, these changes are such that
exactly one-third of the countries change their group position,
shifting either up or down between the Social Democratic the
Corporatist regime categories and between the Corporatist and
the Liberal regime categories.
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Distinct Regimes:
Empirical Validation or Heuristic Value?
In conclusion, while Esping-Andersen's ground breaking
study offered the first vigorous effort to verify distinct regime
theory, there are serious methodological weaknesses in both the
conceptualization and quantification of the decommodicifation
index, which represented the empirical cornerstone of this study.
In examining how this variable was constructed we find that
the decommodification index appears to be more a proxy for
replacement rates of old age pensions than a broad measure
of several dimensions of unemployment, old age and sickness
benefits. When the index is adjusted so that unemployment and
sickness benefits are weighted the same as old age pensions, a
large proportion of the sample countries shift their rank-order
position from one regime to another. An appraisal of what is
included and what is left out of the operational definition of decommodification, suggests that this measure fails to standardize
the real value of benefits (via purchasing power parities) and
that the selection of programs from different countries does not
represent a comprehensive account of the benefits provided in
these areas, which diminishes the ability to make a valid systematic comparison. Thus, despite an elaborate effort to quantify the
distinct liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes, the
empirical analysis falls far short of robust validation.
The inadequate empirical validation of distinct regime theory,
however, does not negate its heuristic value as way of thinking
about and trying to categorize modern welfare state. Indeed, the
analysis of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has fueled considerable research into welfare state typologies-northern versus southern Europe (Leibfried, 1993, Ferrera, 1996), protestant
versus catholic (Castles, 1993) and differences between the AngloAmerican welfare states. Responding to Esping-Andersen's categories Leibfried (1992) distingishes among Germanic, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and Levantine (Latin rim countries) regimes.
In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism-orFour (1991) Castles and
Mitchell suggest a fourth type of welfare state--dubbed radical
liberal-can be identified which is more redistributive in nature than the liberal welfare state identified in the three worlds
typology.
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It is important to recognize that the distinct regimes rest on an
empirically fuzzy foundation upon which to build other empirical
analysis. As noted earlier, Goodin et. al. (1999) apply EspingAndersen's typology in their study of three countries representing
Social Democratic, Liberal, and Corporatist regimes. Selecting the
Netherlands as the country representative of Social Democratic
regimes, they conclude that the "social democratic regime is the
best of all possible worlds," based on a highly detailed (over 40
pages of tables) comparative analysis of outcome criteria for the
three countries (Goodin, et. al. 1999, p. 260.). At the same time,
however, after reexamining the original typology of Three Worlds
Esping Andersen (1999, p 87) concluded that based on a more
comprehensive analysis the Netherlands shifts from the Social
Democratic regime to "squarely a member of the conservative
Continental European fold"-or a Corporatist regime.
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